


DTIC FILE COPY

AD-A208 614



# CLIC PAPERS

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT  
POLICY AND STRATEGY STATEMENTS

DTIC  
SELECTED  
15 MAR 1989  
S E D.

Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict  
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

This document has been approved  
for public release and may be  
distributed as unlimited, unrestricted

89 3 15 010

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No 0704-0188 Date Jun 30 1986	
1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>Unclassified</b>			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS <b>NA</b>		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY <b>NA</b>			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE <b>NA</b>					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensify Conflict		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) <b>A-AF CLIC</b>	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)  <b>Langley AFB, VA 23665-5556</b>		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)  <b>Low-Intensity Conflict Policy and Strategy Statements (Unclassified)</b>					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) <b>William F. Furr, Lt Col, USAF</b>					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT <b>Final</b>		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO <b>NA</b>	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) <b>1989, January</b>		15. PAGE COUNT <b>34</b>
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	<b>Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), National Security Strategy, National Security Policy</b>		
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) <b>Low-intensity conflict has been the subject of much discussion and debate over the past several years. This debate has been carried on in the halls of Congress, throughout the various departments of the Executive branch, in academia, in various public forums, and in the media. The Department of Defense has been deeply involved in these discussions from the outset. During this time, the concept of exactly what low-intensity conflict is has been evolving and a number of strategies have been offered to counter the many forms of low-intensity conflict. One result of these discussions and debates was the formulation of a classified National Security Decision Directive which established national policy and strategy for low-intensity conflict.</b>  <b>This paper presents verbatim extracts concerning low-intensity conflict from key policy and strategy documents produced by the White House and the Department of Defense. These documents include the White House (cont'd on back)</b>					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>Unclassified</b>		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL <b>Maj Ron Zelms</b>			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) <b>(304) 764-2630</b>		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL <b>A-AF CLIC</b>

19. cont'd

National Security Strategy of the United States for 1987 and 1988 which were mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433); the 1987 President's Report to the Congress on U.S. Capabilities to Engage in Low Intensity Conflict and Conduct Special Operations which was mandated by the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (PL 99-661); and the Fiscal Years 1987 and 1988 Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the Congress.

**LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT**  
**POLICY AND STRATEGY STATEMENTS**

Compiled by  
WILLIAM F. FURR, LT COL, USAF

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict  
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665-5556

January 1989

## **DISCLAIMER**

This paper represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, the Department of the Army, or the Department of the Air Force. The paper has been cleared for public release by security and policy review authorities.

## **THE ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT**

The mission of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) is to improve the Army and Air Force posture for engaging in low-intensity conflict (LIC), elevate awareness throughout the Army and Air Force of the role of the military instrument of national power in low-intensity conflict, including the capabilities needed to realize that role, and provide an infrastructure for eventual transition to a joint and, perhaps, interagency activity.

## **CLIC PAPERS**

CLIC PAPERS are informal, occasional publications sponsored by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. They are dedicated to the advancement of the art and science of the application of the military instrument of national power in the low-intensity conflict environment. All military members and civilian Defense Department employees are invited to contribute original, unclassified manuscripts for publication as CLIC PAPERS. Topics can include any aspect of military involvement in low-intensity conflict to include history, doctrine, strategy, or operations. Papers should be as brief and concise as possible. Interested authors should submit double-spaced typed manuscripts along with a brief, one-page abstract to the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, VA 23665-5556.

## PREVIOUS CLIC PAPERS

Previous CLIC PAPERS are available in most major military libraries. Copies can be obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22304-6145, telephone (202) 274-6434 or AUTOVON 284-6434 or through your local DTIC account representative. Copies can also be obtained from the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), US Army Logistics Management College, Ft Lee, VA 23803-6043, telephone (804) 734-4255 or AUTOVON 687-4255. These papers together with their DTIC and DLSIE reference number are listed below.

<u>DTIC AD#</u>	<u>DLSIE LD#</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>
A185 972	073892A	Operational Considerations in LIC
A185 973	073893A	Logistical Considerations in LIC
A185 974	073894A	Security Assistance and LIC: A Challenge to Excellence
A185 975	073896A	The Role of Reserve Forces in LIC
A185 976	073895A	Compilation of LIC References and Bibliography, Vol I
A185 977	073897A	Army Medical Department Roles and Functions in LIC
A185 978	073899A	Operational Art in LIC
A186 280	073898A	LIC Imperatives for Success
A193 702	Pending	Logistic Support for LIC An Air Force Perspective
A193 703	Pending	Framework for Competitive Strategies Development in LIC
A193 704	Pending	US Armed Forces Public Affairs Roles in LIC
A193 705	Pending	LIC Education and Training Within the DoD
A193 706	Pending	Planning for Combat Employment of Air Power in PCOs
A198 670	Pending	Modern Terrorism: Potential for Increased Lethality
A198 668	Pending	Aid to Democratic States Facing Revolutionary Warfare
A198 669	Pending	Technology Guidelines and Military Applications in LIC
A199 026	Pending	Introduction to Understanding Latin Americans
Pending	Pending	Arms Transfers and the Third World
Pending	Pending	Compilation of LIC References and Bibliography, Vol II
Pending	Pending	The Literature of Low-Intensity Conflict
Pending	Pending	US Military Civic Action in Honduras, 1982-1985
Pending	Pending	Psychological strategies in LIC

## PREFACE

Low-intensity conflict has been the subject of much discussion and debate over the past several years. This debate has been carried on in the halls of Congress, throughout the various departments of the Executive branch, in academia, in various public forums, and in the media. The Department of Defense has been deeply involved in these discussions from the outset. During this time, the concept of exactly what low-intensity conflict is has been evolving and a number of strategies have been offered to counter the many forms of low-intensity conflict. One result of these discussions and debates was the formulation of a classified National Security Decision Directive which established national policy and strategy for low-intensity conflict.

This paper presents verbatim extracts concerning low-intensity conflict from key policy and strategy documents produced by the White House and the Department of Defense. These documents include the White House National Security Strategy of the United States for 1987 and 1988 which were mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433); the 1987 President's Report to the Congress on U.S. Capabilities to Engage in Low Intensity Conflict and Conduct Special Operations which was mandated by the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (PL 99-661); and the Fiscal Years 1987 and 1988 Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the Congress.

## **Low-Intensity Conflict Policy and Strategy Statements**

Prior to 1987, national security policy and strategy for low-intensity conflict did not exist. In fact, there was no government-wide agreement on a definition or even whether the term should be hyphenated.

Low-intensity conflict (LIC) has been called an environment, a paradigm, a concept, an operational construct, and a misnomer. Whatever it is called, the term has been the subject of much discussion, debate, controversy, and confusion. The chart of page 2 reflects the myriad of terms used either as a substitute for LIC or used to define or explain it.

Over the past 7 years, low-intensity conflict has been defined and redefined with each new author adding or modifying based on his perspective. The current Joint Chiefs of Staff definition is:

Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.

This definition reflects emerging national LIC policy and strategy which was first articulated in January 1987 by a White House paper entitled, National Security Strategy of the United States, and further clarified in June of that year by a National Security Decision Directive on LIC. These two documents established the basis for United States LIC policy and strategy.

The remainder of this paper consists of verbatim extracts from key policy and strategy documents produced by the White House and the Department of Defense. These documents include the White House National Security Strategy of the United States for 1987 and 1988, the 1987 President's Report to the Congress on U.S. Capabilities to Engage in Low Intensity Conflict and Conduct Special Operations, and the Fiscal Years 1987 and 1988 Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the Congress.



Counterinsurgency  
Peacekeeping  
Antiterrorism  
Insurgency  
Low Intensity Warfare  
Low Level Warfare  
Internal Warfare  
Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare  
Internal Conflict  
Countersubversive Warfare  
Conflict Short of War  
High Probability Conflict  
Subversive Warfare  
Concealed Aggression  
Subterranean War  
Aggressive Containment  
Anti-Imperialist Warfare  
Constrained Operations  
War Against Lesser Adversaries  
Forth Dimension Warfare  
Attenuated Conflict  
Modern Warfare  
Peripheral War  
Sublimited Wars  
Surrogate War  
Armed Peace  
Shadow War  
Covert Wars

Combatting Terrorism  
Peacetime Contingencies  
Counterterrorism  
Unconventional Warfare  
Lower Level Warfare  
Revolutionary Warfare  
People's War  
Guerrilla Warfare  
Foreign Internal Defense  
Wars of National Liberation  
Uncomfortable Wars  
Irregular Political Warfare  
Brushfire Wars  
Paramilitary Criminality  
Marginal Military Operations  
Restricted Engagement  
Anti-Bandit Campaigns  
Remote Area Conflict  
Proinsurgency  
Transnational Conflict  
Strategie Oblique  
Protracted War  
Ambiguous War  
Violent Peace  
Indirect War  
Special War  
Small Wars  
Dark Wars

#### Alternative Terms for Low-Intensity Conflict

The White House  
National Security Strategy of the United States  
January 1987  
(Pages 32-34)

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Conflict in the Third World can pose serious threats to U.S. security interests. Low Intensity Conflicts, which take place at levels below conventional war but above the routine, peaceful competition among states, can be particularly troublesome. They often involve a protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies. Low Intensity Conflicts may be waged by a combination of means, including the use of political, economic, informational, and military instruments. They are often localized, but can have significant regional and global security implications.

Major causes of Low Intensity Conflict are instability and lack of political and economic development in the Third World (though Low Intensity Conflict can occur in areas outside the Third World as well). These conditions provide fertile ground for unrest and for groups and nations wishing to exploit unrest for their own purposes. The resulting conflicts are of concern to the United States when they assault U.S. national interests and the security, values, or political foundations of the United States, our friends, and allies. Low Intensity Conflict can gradually isolate the United States, its allies, and major trading partners from the Third World and from each other. This isolation can be manifest in economic, political, and military terms.

Specifically, Low Intensity Conflict can lead to:

- o Interruption of Western access to vital resources.
- o Gradual loss of U.S. military basing and access rights.
- o Expanded threats to key sea lines of communications.
- o Gradual shifting of allies and trading partners away from the United States into positions of accommodation with hostile interests.
- o Expanded opportunities for Soviet political and military gains.

An effective U.S. response to this form of warfare requires the national will to sustain long-term commitments. The United States has addressed the manifestations of Low Intensity Conflict through a tough counter-terrorism policy; support for democratic

resistance movements; and political, economic, and military assistance to developing nations to help them prevent or combat low intensity challenges.

U.S. policy for dealing with Low Intensity Conflict situations may be summarized as follows: When it is in U.S. interest to do so, the United States:

- o Will take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal or external threats to their independence and stability by systematically employing, in coordination with friends and allies, the full range of political, economic, informational, and military instruments of power. Where possible, action will be taken before instability leads to violence.

- o Will work to ameliorate the underlying causes of instability and conflict in the Third World by pursuing foreign assistance, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of democratic social and political orders.

- o May support selected resistance movements acting in opposition to regimes working against U.S. interests. Such support will be coordinated with friends and allies and may contain political, informational, economic, and military elements.

- o Will take steps to discourage Soviet and other state-sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive forces to exploit instability in the Third World.

The Low Intensity Conflict strategies that support these policies must coordinate the use of a variety of policy instruments among U.S. Government agencies and internationally. Responses may draw on economic, political, and informational tools, as well as military assistance.

**Economic Policy and Low Intensity Conflict.** U.S. policy for Low Intensity Conflict recognizes that long term political and economic development will reduce the underlying causes of instability of the Third World, help undermine the attractiveness of totalitarian regimes, and eventually lead to conditions favorable to U.S. and Western interests. Therefore, we will encourage expansion of free trade, the development of private enterprise, and the expansion and independence of local economies. U.S. development assistance and economic aid programs facilitate these policies. In addition, we will encourage private investment in the Third World when that investment supports balanced economic growth.

**Informational Policy and Low Intensity Conflict.** Low Intensity Conflict is a political struggle in which ideas may be as important as arms. We hold significant advantages over our adversaries in this area. In contrast to our adversaries, we have an open political system that thrives on communication and truth. We must ensure, however, that accurate information concerning American ideals and objectives is available throughout the Third World; and that the resources needed to accomplish this are available.

**Political Instruments and Low Intensity Conflict.** We recognize that other nations may not necessarily develop along democratic lines identical to ours. Nevertheless, we seek to encourage the development of political systems that protect the rights of the individual and provide for representative government, free institutions, and an environment in which human dignity can flourish. We do this partially by example, and by defending our own ideals when they are challenged. We can also promote development of humane social orders by helping eliminate security threats and the underlying economic causes of unrest and instability.

**Military Instruments in Low Intensity Conflict.** The fundamental tenet of U.S. strategy for dealing with Low Intensity Conflict directed against our friends and allies is that military institutions in threatened states must become able to provide security for their citizens and governments. U.S. Low Intensity Conflict policy, therefore, recognizes that indirect--rather than direct--applications of U.S. military power are the most appropriate and cost effective ways to achieve national goals. The principal military instrument in Low Intensity Conflict, therefore, is security assistance.

The primary role for U.S. armed force in Low Intensity Conflict is to support and facilitate the security assistance program. The military services must also stand ready to provide more direct forms of military assistance when called upon. Usually, this assistance will consist of technical training and logistical support. The services and the Unified Commands must also be prepared for the effective execution of contingency and peacekeeping operations when such operations are required to protect national interests. U.S. combat forces will be introduced into Low Intensity Conflict situations only as a last resort and when vital national interests cannot otherwise be adequately protected.

**Narcotics Trafficking and Low Intensity Conflict.** Narcotics trafficking can breed violence, fuel instability and threaten governing institutions wherever it is found. The vast revenues produced by illegal narcotics sales, and concomitant use of international financial networks to launder the proceeds of these transactions, can promote the type of instability that becomes a breeding ground for Low Intensity Conflict. For these reasons, our policies for dealing with drug trafficking provide important support for our efforts to deal with Low Intensity Conflict.

**Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict.** Under some circumstances, terrorism can be an important aspect of Low Intensity Conflict. This Administration has taken significant steps to define and implement policies to counter international terrorism. These policies focus on deterring, pre-empting and effectively reacting to international terrorist incidents. Low Intensity Conflict policy goes beyond this, however, and deals with the broader problem of supporting groups and governments against which terrorism is being used as a subversive weapon.

We must realize that Low Intensity Conflicts are frequently protracted struggles. In addition, most of the instruments of power that we can bring to bear on them work indirectly and over a long period of time. Therefore, we must be patient in such struggles. It is important that we prevail, but especially important that we recognize that we often cannot do so easily or quickly. On the other hand, we do hold important advantages. We represent a model of political and economic development that promises freedom from political domination and economic privation. If we can protect our own security, and maintain an environment of reasonable stability and open trade and communication throughout the Third World, political, economic, and social forces will eventually work to our advantage.

The White House  
National Security Strategy of the United States  
January 1988  
(Pages 34-35)

STRATEGY FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

While high intensity conflict has been successfully deterred in most regions of primary strategic interest to the United States, low intensity conflicts continue to pose a variety of threats to the achievement of important U.S. objectives. As described in last year's report, low intensity conflict typically manifests itself as political-military confrontation below the level of conventional war, frequently involving protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies, and ranging from subversion to the direct use of military force. These conflicts, generally in the Third World, can have both regional and global implications for our national security interests. For example:

- o Military basing, access and transit rights in the Philippines, key to U.S. power projection capabilities in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, are presently threatened by the communist insurgency being waged against the Philippine Government.

- o In mineral-rich southern Africa, insurgencies, economic instability and apartheid, as well as ethnic tribal conflicts, pose potential threats to the extraction of essential raw materials and their export to industries in the West and Japan. The conflicts endemic to the region are exacerbated by the activity of the Soviet Union and its surrogates.

- o Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in El Salvador and elsewhere in Latin America threaten nascent democracies in the region which are already struggling with chronic poverty, economic underdevelopment, and the growing influence of narcotics cartels.

- o Libya has used the threat of restricting or denying oil shipments to blunt West European response to state-sponsored terrorism, while simultaneously training terrorists on Libyan soil. Freedom of action for some U.S. allies can be limited by economic ties.

Our strategies for dealing with low intensity conflict recognize that U.S. responses in such situations must be realistic, often discreet, and founded on a clear relationship between the conflict's outcome and important U.S. national security interests. Many low intensity conflicts have no direct relevance to those interests, while others may affect them in the

most fundamental ways. When a U.S. response is called for, we take care to ensure that it is developed in accordance with the principles of international and domestic law, which affirm the inherent right of states to use force in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack; and to assist one another in maintaining internal order against insurgency, terrorism, illicit narcotics traffic, and other characteristic forms of low intensity conflict.

Consistent with our strategies for dealing with low intensity conflict, when it is in U.S. interest to do so, the United States will:

- o Work to ameliorate the underlying causes of conflict in the Third World by promoting economic development and the growth of democratic political institutions.

- o Support selected resistance movements opposing oppressive regimes working against U.S. interests. Such support will be coordinated with friends and allies.

- o Take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal or external threats to their independence and stability by employing appropriate instruments of U.S. power. Where possible, action will be taken early--before instability leads to widespread violence; and emphasis will be placed on those measures which strengthen the threatened regime's long-term capability to deal with threats to its freedom and stability.

- o Take steps to discourage Soviet and other state-sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive forces to exploit instability.

- o Assist other countries in the interdiction and eradication of illicit narcotics production and traffic. Measures which have proven particularly effective include aid to expand and improve the affected country's law enforcement capabilities, to preserve the independence and integrity of its judicial system, and to provide for the sharing of intelligence and investigative capabilities.

Our own military forces have demonstrated capabilities to engage in low intensity conflict, and these capabilities have improved substantially in the last several years. But the most appropriate application of U.S. military power is usually indirect through security assistance--training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment. Recipients of such assistance bear the primary responsibility for promoting their own security interests with the U.S. aid provided. Our program of assistance to El Salvador illustrates a successful indirect application of U.S. military power.

The balanced application of the various elements of national power is necessary to protect U.S. interests in low intensity conflicts. But in the final analysis, the tools we have at our disposal are of little use without the support of the American people, and their willingness to stay the course in what can be protracted struggles. We cannot prevail if there is a sharp asymmetry of wills--if our adversaries' determination is greater than our own. At the same time we hold important advantages. We represent a model of political and economic development that promises freedom from political oppression and economic privation. If we can protect our own security, and maintain an environment of reasonable stability and open trade and communication throughout the Third World, political, economic, and social forces should eventually work to our advantage.



The White House  
Report to the Congress  
U.S. Capabilities to Engage in  
Low Intensity Conflict and Conduct Special Operations  
(Secret)  
December 15, 1987  
(Unclassified Extracts)

## I. Introduction

The most destructive forms of conflict that could occur in the future -- nuclear war and large-scale conventional war with the Soviet Union -- are also the least probable. This is because we have developed strong deterrents to such conflicts. We must continue this policy; but as nuclear and conventional conflict have become less likely, Low Intensity Conflict, occurring generally in the Third World, remains a serious threat to U.S. interests and will continue to threaten these interests in the years ahead.

### The Need for an Integrated Low Intensity Conflict Concept

At times, the discussion and debate on the subject of Low Intensity Conflict has been characterized by confusion. For example, some equate Low Intensity Conflict with terrorism, some with trade sanctions, and others see it as all conflict short of direct engagement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This lack of clear focus has complicated development of effective policy to deal with Low Intensity Conflict in the past.

Low Intensity Conflict presents broad political-military problems that require balanced application of economic, political, informational, and military instruments of national power. Many government departments and agencies, therefore, must be involved in developing and executing plans for resolving Low Intensity Conflict situations. Under such circumstances, coordination must be extensive, and it can be difficult to effect.

## II. The Nature of Low Intensity Conflict

Low Intensity Conflict is political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low Intensity Conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. These conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but may contain regional and global security implications.

Low Intensity Conflict is of primary concern to the United States when its elements are used to assault the national interests, values, and political foundations of the U.S., its friends, and allies. The strategic consequences of Low Intensity Conflict can isolate the U.S. from its allies and global trading partners and weaken the political and economic institutions of the free world.

The U.S. response to this form of warfare requires the national will to sustain long-term commitments. The U.S. has dealt with Low Intensity Conflict through a counter-terrorism policy, support for resistance movements, political and economic support of developing nations, helping governments combat low intensity aggression, contingency operations, suppression of illegal drug trafficking, and peacekeeping operations.

#### The Problem in the Third World

Within Third World countries, the Low Intensity Conflict threat is manifest as overt and/or covert low intensity aggression. Such aggression may be instigated by either indigenous or externally sponsored groups. The methods employed by the antagonists may include use of disinformation, subversion, curtailment of access to resources, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and direct invasion not involving combat between regular conventional armed forces. Further, illegal drug trafficking, the substantial revenues produced, and the concomitant exploitation of international financial networks are peripheral to, but serve as facilitators of, instability and must be dealt with as integral elements of Low Intensity Conflict strategy. Terrorism and illegal drug trafficking are specifically addressed by the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the National Drug Policy Board, respectively.

When Low Intensity Conflict manifests itself as identifiable aggression -- such as the insurgency in El Salvador -- recognition of the problem and generation of an appropriate response is made easier. Identifying and addressing the preconditions of potentially hostile situations before they erupt into full-blown conflicts, however, is more difficult. Yet early identification of potential Low Intensity Conflict situations is important to allow us to take preventive actions in order to avoid unfavorable outcomes affecting our national interests while the situation is relatively manageable.

The causal forces underlying Low Intensity Conflict result from the interplay of broad political, economic, cultural and social forces, and require timely and appropriate policy responses to reduce the potential for higher cost intervention later. When consistent with our national security interests, the United States will help selected Third World governments to counter terrorism, subversion or other detrimental phenomena that

gradually erode governability, while at the same time bolstering the development of viable economic, political, and social systems within these countries.

When U.S. policy involves support to opposition groups, we must consider the nature of the government being opposed, its level of hostility toward the U.S., and the effects of this hostility on broad U.S. political, economic and strategic interests. In this case as well, a coordinated broad-based response is necessary.

### III. Progress Report -- What We've Done

#### National Policy and Strategy for Low Intensity Conflict

Working from the Low Intensity Conflict concept and threat defined in Section II, we have developed an overarching policy and strategy to guide government-wide efforts. These are in accord not only with our domestic law, but with international legal principles that affirm the inherent right of states to use force in individual or collective self defense against armed attack, and to assist others in helping to maintain internal order against insurgency, revolution, subversive activity, and related phenomena which can be characteristic of Low Intensity Conflict. U.S. policy for guiding coordinated government action includes:

- o Taking measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal or external threats to their independence and stability by systematically employing, in coordination with friends and allies, the full range of political, economic, informational, and military instruments of power. Where possible, action will be taken before instability leads to violence.

- o Promoting economic development and the growth of democratic social and political orders by working to ameliorate the underlying causes of instability and conflict in the Third World by pursuing foreign assistance, trade, and investment programs.

- o Supporting selected resistance movements acting in opposition to regimes working against U.S. interests. Such support will be coordinated with friends and allies and may contain political, informational, economic, and military elements.

- o Taking steps to discourage Soviet and other state-sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive forces to exploit instability in the Third World.

## Annex A

### Department of Defense Organization for Low Intensity Conflict

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict is the principal staff assistant and policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all Low Intensity Conflict matters in the Department of Defense. Effective Low Intensity Conflict policy requires the coordination of several areas under the purview of other offices within the Department. Some of these areas are: intelligence; security assistance; resources; research, development and acquisition; budget development and execution; and telecommunications. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction for Low Intensity Conflict to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands. In addition to providing military advice on Low Intensity Conflict to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is the channel of communications through which directives from the Secretary of Defense are passed to the Unified and Specified Commanders who are then responsible for the development and execution of the military aspects of Low Intensity Conflict strategy in their respective areas of responsibility.

#### U.S. Military Forces Available for Use in Low Intensity Conflict Situations

The entire range of non-nuclear forces within the military structure has potential application in Low Intensity Conflict situations. For the sake of brevity, this discussion categorizes this range of forces as falling within the following groups:

##### Combat Maneuver Forces

These generally include the tactical ground, naval, and air forces of the conventional force structure employed to defeat or neutralize similar opposing forces.

##### Special Operations Forces

The Joint Chiefs of Staff define Special Operations as "Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DoD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible." Special Operations Forces consist of Army Special Forces, Navy Sea-Air-Land Teams, Air Force Special Operations units, Ranger Battalions, Special Operations Aviation Units, Psychological Operations Units, and Civil Affairs Units.

## Combat Support/Combat Service Support Forces

These are forces that directly support combat forces by providing additional firepower or support services, e.g., aviation, medical units, engineer units, supply units, and intelligence units.

### U.S. Military Forces and Tasks in Low Intensity Conflict

The application of U.S. military capabilities in Low Intensity Conflict can take several forms:

#### Foreign Internal Defense

Foreign Internal Defense refers to the role the U.S. military plays in the overall effort of the U.S. Government to help a nation free or protect its society from internal and external forms of low intensity aggression. The primary role of the U.S. military in these situations is to provide security assistance. This is accomplished by ensuring the flow of U.S. materiel support to strengthen a nation's armed forces, by providing both technical and tactical training as well as logistical and intelligence advice and support, and by advising in both field and garrison environments.

Active and Reserve Army Civil Affairs units are organized and trained to facilitate establishing the essential economic, social, and political interfaces with societies where U.S. military forces are deployed in pursuit of U.S. policy objectives. Recent Congressional amendments to existing statutes now authorize these units to engage in humanitarian assistance and civic assistance activities. This will provide a more subtle military capability for dealing with a broader range of activities in Low Intensity Conflict.

Intelligence units can assist in building a military intelligence apparatus or facilitate the sharing of U.S. collected intelligence. Signal units can help develop communications systems. Logistics units can advise on the development of logistics storage, distribution, and control as well as facilitate the flow of U.S. materiel assistance. Combat Support Units, especially aviation, can also augment a host nation's mobility and assist in the movement of host nation combat forces. When authorized, the U.S. military can also assist law enforcement entities in combatting drug trafficking. U.S. military efforts in El Salvador are examples of Foreign Internal Defense operations.

## Peacekeeping Operations

These are U.S. military operations designated to support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace.

Peacekeeping operations are normally conducted by conventional forces interposed between belligerents. U.S. participation may include troop units or be limited to individuals assigned to observer groups. Normally, these operations are conducted with agreement of the parties to the conflict. U.S. military efforts in the Sinai Desert are examples of a Peacekeeping Operation.

## Combatting Terrorism

There are two aspects to combatting terrorism. One aspect, antiterrorism, is defensive in nature and involves measures to protect facilities and persons. The other aspect is counterterrorism, which is active in nature and may include diplomatic, legal, intelligence and in certain cases, military initiatives to deter, preempt or effectively react to terrorist incidents.

## Peacetime Contingency Operations

These operations can range from small to massive employment of military forces. They can range from short duration events that are planned in secrecy and boldly executed, sometimes on short notice, to large, highly visible commitments of U.S. military power over extended periods of time. Examples of such operations are strike, recovery, rescue, demonstration, show of force, special operations, and intelligence operations.

Contingency operations are usually conducted by conventional forces with Special Operations Forces playing a supporting role. Examples of short duration contingency operations are the U.S. raid on Libya and the rescue of U.S. citizens on Grenada. U.S. protection of U.S.-flag shipping in the Persian Gulf is an example of a large, long-term commitment.

## Summary

Success in achieving national security objectives in Low Intensity Conflict requires a consistent strategy for the application of all instruments of national power -- not the military instrument alone. Indirect rather than direct applications of U.S. military power are generally the most appropriate and cost effective ways to achieve national goals. The principal role of the military in Low Intensity Conflict, therefore, is to support and facilitate security assistance programs. However, combat forces may be employed directly when interests so dictate. No one military capability or type of

force can be singled out as the answer to Low Intensity Conflict situations. Most military capabilities have utility across the entire conflict spectrum and can accomplish important tasks in Low Intensity Conflict. The key to successful application of military power in Low Intensity Conflict is accurately identifying the requirements of the situation and then selecting from a menu of forces and capabilities those which are best suited for the situation at hand.

Secretary of Defense  
Annual Report to the Congress  
Fiscal Year 1988  
(Pages 56-62)

2. Conventional Deterrence and Low-Intensity Conflict

a. Conventional Deterrence

As was discussed in detail in Chapter I.C., to help deter non-nuclear aggression, U.S. strategy emphasizes the role of conventional forces. This emphasis is in preference to reliance on nuclear weapons, whose deterrent value eroded as the Soviet Union matched or exceeded U.S. capabilities in key areas of our nuclear posture. A robust conventional posture provides us with the safest, most reassuring deterrent at the lowest feasible risk of nuclear war, indeed of any major war. The defense program presented in Part III of this Annual Report reflects our commitment to conventional deterrence.

America's conventional forces are structured and deployed primarily to counter our most serious global threat: Soviet military power. However, they also must be designed to operate with our special operations forces to counter less ominous threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, and when our national interests overwhelmingly require us to commit our troops to combat.

b. Low-Intensity Conflict

Today, the United States confronts several forms of ambiguous aggression in what is popularly referred to as Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). While terrorism, subversion, and insurgency are as ancient as conflict itself, the growing intensity with which they are pursued by our adversaries in the post-World War II era requires a commensurate increase in the attention we devote to them. Indeed, these forms of ambiguous aggression have become so widespread that they have become the "warfare of choice" over the last 40 years. They represent a long-term challenge to our security, a permanent aspect of the "long twilight struggle" between democracy and its enemies.

The increased prominence of terrorism, insurgency, and subversion has several causes. One is that, for better or worse, nuclear weapons have made great power confrontations highly dangerous. The implicit recognition that even if, by their thinking, a nuclear war could be "won," it would exact incalculable costs, has made the Soviet Union look for other means to advance its aggressive designs. Coupled with our nuclear deterrent has also been our conventional deterrent, which has yet to be challenged in Europe and which, with the South



Koreans, successfully blocked communist attempts to subjugate South Korea. Thus the very success of our efforts in deterring nuclear and major conventional aggression has driven Soviet efforts, and those of other hostile states, toward more ambiguous forms of aggression.

These efforts have been aided, and the challenge we face expanded, by the comparatively recent proliferation of Third World states that coincided with the decline of the great European empires following World War II. These new states, in many cases, have encountered economic, political, and social problems that make them ripe for internal upheaval or external exploitation and subversion. The rampant growth in the international arms trade, coupled with the increased lethality of weapons, have combined to reduce the costs to countries planning to use LIC. All this occurred as the United States' world role increased, both as a consequence of our emergence as the de facto leader of the free world after World War II, and because of our rapidly expanding network of political, economic, and social relationships within an environment of increased global interdependence. This, of course, has made us more vulnerable to these forms of aggression. Indeed, today there seems to be no shortage of adversaries who seek to undermine our security by persistently nibbling away at our interests through these shadow wars carried on by guerrillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives in the hope that they have found a weak point in our defenses. For them, low-intensity warfare, be it terrorism, insurgency, or subversion, represents a cost-effective means of aggression for advancing their interests, while minimizing the prospect of a forceful response by the United States and our allies.

In a sense, we face a dual threat. First, there are the political, social, and economic instabilities endemic to many Third World nations that make them ripe for exploitation by radical or disenfranchised internal elements. Often these elements foment hostility focused on the so-called "neocolonialist" West, particularly the United States. Secondly, the Soviet Union is eager to exploit this instability directly or through its proxies, to promote terrorism, subversion (as in Grenada, Ethiopia, Afghanistan in 1978, and South Yemen) and insurgency, thereby undermining U.S. security interests through this "indirect approach."

Essentially, we are also faced with another conflict potential, different from either nuclear war or more traditional, conventional military operations. We must combat this threat to our security by assisting those friendly states that rely on our help at a time when our defense resources are already stretched to their limit. But we all should recognize that here, as elsewhere, the most cost-effective defense for the United States is to help others. Thus, an "economy of force" strategy is

mandated. Furthermore, we are working to integrate our military strategy, to an unprecedented degree, within an overall interagency and intergovernmental approach to address the problem in its political, economic, and social dimensions, as well as its military form. Finally, each major kind of low-intensity warfare requires its own strategic approach, since more traditional forms of deterrence are not likely to dissuade those who practice these subtle, ambiguous methods of aggression.

### (1) Combatting Insurgencies

The problems of decolonization and nation building associated with the emergence of Third World states from colonial rule has led in many cases to political, social, and economic instabilities that threaten the survival of legitimate governments, and compromise U.S. security interests. These conditions also exist in older independent nations of the Third World. Generally, these instabilities, combined with popular dissatisfaction and the target government's inability to respond effectively, lay the groundwork for exploitation by internal elements who seek to effect through violence what they cannot change through peaceful, orderly means. Frequently in these instances we find the Soviet Union and its surrogates capitalizing on a nation's misfortunes by supporting these insurgents in their attempt to overthrow the existing order. When they have succeeded, as we have seen, the result is the imposition of a far more odious form of government, as occurred in Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

In other examples, insurgencies secure support by promising freedom from repression, and then impose far more repressive governments than any the world has seen since the Middle Ages. Iran is the prime example in this category, and the lesson for the United States is that we should be reluctant indeed to join an apparently popular revolution against a government friendly to the United States, as was the Shah's government in Iran, and only after asking ourselves whether the people involved actually will benefit by any change in rulers. In the Philippines, we satisfied this test and the results now more than justify our actions.

Our response to all these challenges generally has been, and should be, to assist friendly governments threatened by externally supported insurgents in alleviating those legitimate grievances levied against them. At the same time, we are helping the host country regime combat those insurgent groups whose aim is not reasoned reform, but rather the seizing of power to impose their own agenda by force. Since the root problems of insurgency are primarily political, social, and economic, assisting the host country combat the military threat is but one element in a comprehensive strategy that must address the conflict's multiple dimensions. The key to success in this kind of war is the host

country's willingness to make those changes and reforms required to preempt the insurgents' cause thereby frustrating their attempts to intimidate the people and cripple the economic infrastructure.

This approach requires a long-term effort on our part. Insurgencies are typically protracted conflicts, and therefore our strategy must be designed for the long haul. It is not so much our objective to help these nations win battles against insurgent military forces as it is to assist their military in buying the time necessary for needed reforms to take root and flourish under governments friendly to the United States. Unless the host government succeeds in eliminating the underlying causes of insurgency, any military successes won in the field will prove fleeting.

Our specific role is to work with the other appropriate U.S. government agencies and host country organizations, as necessary, to integrate our effort into a comprehensive strategy to combat the insurgency when that is indicated, and, where possible, identify at an early stage those conditions that foster insurgency. Our support typically involves training indigenous host country forces, providing assistance in technical areas like communications and intelligence, and ensuring that the armed forces have the equipment needed to exploit the training they receive.

In discussing the proper "Uses of Military Power" in last year's Annual Report and in earlier speeches, I noted that the United States should not treat lightly the prospect of employing American combat forces. From the point of view of one who bears a large part of the responsibility for the lives of American troops, I do not believe the country is ill-served by the requirement that, before we commit military personnel, our national interests be so heavily involved that the only way left to serve those interests is by the commitment to combat of our troops. This caution is especially relevant when contemplating their use to assist regimes threatened by insurgency. For one thing, the deterioration of the host country's situation that could result in a call for U.S. troops is, in itself, an indication that the regime is not making progress in enacting needed reforms. Without this kind of commitment on their part, any military effort on our part will ultimately prove fruitless. Nor will the American people or their elected representatives in the Congress sustain support for regimes that refuse to do what is needed while the lives of American servicemen are at risk. For this reason we must also have a clear grasp of how the regime targeted by insurgents represents a long-term and absolutely vital interest to our security. Without this condition, we stand little chance of prevailing in a protracted conflict. This also ensures that we will commit the requisite resources to sustain our strategy over the long haul.

Also, we must have a clear understanding with the country we seek to assist, and within our own councils, of how our forces will work to achieve clearly defined strategic objectives. The assisted nation must seek to assume the full burden for its defense at the earliest possible moment. Indeed, this is the ultimate measure of our strategy's success. In the past six years we have done much to enhance our special operations forces and general purpose forces to operate effectively in this unique conflict environment. Yet this effort does not eliminate the need to constantly reassess the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed. If the host regime will not address itself to the task at hand, U.S. combat forces cannot be expected to remain indefinitely. Finally, we should commit combat forces only as a last resort, after diplomatic, economic, and other political options have been exhausted.

The history of the past 40 years indicates that, whether it goes by the name of insurgency, a war of national liberation, or revolutionary warfare, this kind of ambiguous aggression poses a major threat to U.S. security interests. This threat defies a strictly military solution, although there is a clear military dimension to the conflict. Given its ambiguous and protracted nature, and the decisive role played by the regime targeted by insurgents, we must have a unique strategy and force capability to counter it.

Of course, we oppose those who seek to impose totalitarianism in the Third World, but we must recognize that there are many who fight to restore the liberty and independence they have lost to communist aggression. These peoples, be they from Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, or other countries suffering the effects of totalitarian oppression, deserve our support; not only because it is right, but because as President Kennedy observed, "If men and women are in chains anywhere in the world, then freedom is endangered." Thus, as President Reagan has stated, our policy is not "just the prevention of war, but the extension of freedom as well." We are prepared to support those who fight for freedom, not only because it is morally right, but because it is one of the best ways to safeguard the security of the world's democracies.

## (2) Combatting Subversion

While insurgency involves protracted warfare to achieve its ultimate goal of toppling a government, subversion involves actions taken by an external power to recruit and assist indigenous political and military forces to overthrow their government through a coup d'etat. The Soviet Union has utilized subversion as a means of ambiguous aggression since Lenin's time. Some of their more recent successes include Ethiopia and Afghanistan. Had we not responded promptly and forcefully, Grenada would have been added to the list. This form of low-

intensity aggression is not limited to the Soviet Union; it has also been embraced by others, among them Qaddafi's Libya and Castro's Cuba, in attempting to advance their aims.

The key to combatting this subtle form of aggression, which manifests itself in open conflict only at the last possible moment, is the quality and reliability of a nation's indigenous military forces, along with its legitimate political institutions. Although we in this country take for granted the supremacy of civilian authority, this is frequently not the case in many Third World states. Nevertheless, a cornerstone of our strategy to combat subversion concerns our efforts to enhance the capabilities of friendly nation military forces, and to assist them in effecting those reforms that augment their professionalism and emphasize the importance of an apolitical military leadership supportive of free institutions. Countering subversion requires a long-term commitment to creating shared values through exchange programs, training and education, civic action, and related activities. This kind of preventive medicine wards off penetration and subversion of the military by hostile powers bent on effecting a violent change in the established order. In so doing, it reduces the likelihood that our combat forces will ever be requested by a legitimate government under attack by indigenous forces influenced by malevolent external powers. Although we seek to counter subversion through the methods noted above, the United States has, in the past, responded effectively with force to blunt this kind of aggression in Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Grenada (1983), and retains the capability and the will to do so again should it be deemed necessary. Surely, no one can contend that it is to our advantage to allow communist-supported subversion to convert a friendly government into a communist enemy, and particularly not in our own hemisphere.

### (3) Combatting Terrorism

It is safe to say that nothing has so outraged the world's civilized peoples in recent years as the senseless acts of violence carried out by terrorist groups representing radical political and religious views. In its domestic form, terrorism is properly the province of the police forces of a nation. When terrorism becomes international in scope or is aided and abetted by state sponsors, however, the threat posed to U.S. citizens and security interests may require an American military response. This response may occur at two levels. At a lower level, it involves our actions to deter acts of terrorism and, if deterrence fails, to deny the terrorists their objectives. Deterrence, in this case, frequently requires that we not only convey our ability and willingness to punish the perpetrator, but that we convince the terrorist that his objective cannot be achieved; that is, deterrence through denial as well as through the threat of retaliation. Unfortunately, in free societies it

is difficult, if not impossible, to impose the kinds of restrictions that might guarantee the denial of all potential targets to terrorists. Nevertheless, we have undertaken numerous active and passive defensive measures to make our military forces, especially those overseas, less attractive targets for terrorist groups. At the same time we have developed highly trained units that are capable of assisting friendly governments defeat terrorist acts that are already under way, as in the case of hostage seizures.

When terrorism is sponsored by the leaders of sovereign states as a tool of aggression, however, it moves beyond the realm of an internal police matter to a higher level -- that of international conflict involving state-to-state confrontation. Here the situation differs from individual acts of terrorism, as we saw this past April when we identified Libya as clearly responsible for an act of terrorism against our military personnel in West Berlin. The military operations executed by U.S. forces in response to this act of aggression were conventional in nature. They were carried out with exceptional skill, daring, and effectiveness, in the best traditions of all our forces. The action demonstrated many things, one being that we are ready, on very short notice, for very difficult actions involving the solution of particularly complex logistical problems. The Libyan action was not carried out by the kind of special operations forces that are involved in combatting specific terrorist acts while they are in progress and, in a sense, this is even a greater tribute to our conventional forces. It also involves the closest coordination at the interdepartmental level and with our allies. The objective of the Libyan operation was both to strike at terrorist support bases, and to teach the state of Libya that providing terrorist groups with the support necessary to conduct their international campaign of aggression against the United States carries with it a terrible cost. Thus, our strategy for precluding and combatting terrorist acts involve a range of general purpose forces as well as special operations forces.

#### (4) Summary

Unlike nuclear war or a major conventional war, we must concern ourselves not only with deterring ambiguous aggression, but with actively combatting it, for it is going on all around us. To some extent, it is the product of our success in preventing wars at higher levels of intensity that has forced our adversaries to pursue these wars in the shadows. With their high mixture of political, economic, and social elements blended into a military threat, these forms of ambiguous aggression demand the closest coordination between the United States and its allies, and within our government itself. A multidimensional threat demands a comprehensive response. Other sections of this report consider, in detail, how the Defense Department is improving

special operations forces and general purpose forces to contribute to the Administration's national strategy for combatting low-intensity aggression. If the Congress provides us the resources and the unswerving support to execute this strategy over the long haul, the "long twilight struggle" will favor the cause of democracy and freedom. If we fail, these forms of aggression will remain the most likely and the most enduring threats to our security.

Secretary of Defense  
Annual Report to the Congress  
Fiscal Year 1989  
(Pages 58-63)

5. Low-Intensity Conflict

Low-intensity conflict (LIC) poses a major threat to our security and our interests around the world. LIC involves indirect, or ambiguous, aggression such as terrorism, subversion, and insurgency. These forms of conflict are employed by our enemies to undermine this country's political, economic, and moral vitality. By engaging in the protracted warfare common to LIC, our enemies hope to assault our resolve and ultimately to isolate us from our friends and allies. In the case of the Soviet Union, its resort to these forms of aggression, which seek to exploit instability, particularly in the Third World, are an attempt to circumvent our conventional and nuclear strength. Indeed, the very success of our nuclear and conventional deterrents actually encourage the Soviet's use of LIC's indirect approach.

Our enemies' strategy can be seen clearly in the case of Grenada. Here a small coterie of communists seized power and began imposing a totalitarian form of government with the advice and support of the Soviets and the Cubans. Their ultimate purpose was to convert Grenada into yet another outpost for regional subversion. Our liberation of that island and the capture of plans, documents, and considerable storehouses of arms afforded us a rare opportunity to see behind the facade of subterfuge that characterizes the Soviet's attempt to establish communist dictatorships, while hiding behind well-chosen phrases pleading democratic principles.

One type of low-intensity conflict -- terrorism -- has taken on a new character. What once was largely the activity of small, frustrated extremist groups within countries has become a virtual multinational enterprise, and state-sponsored terrorism has emerged as a new weapon in the arsenal of ambiguous aggression. This is not to suggest a vast, single-minded conspiracy manipulated by one source. Instead, what is emerging is an underground, or parallel, international system in which various states are engaging in creating, supporting, training, arming, or providing diplomatic cover for terrorist organizations. The terrorist attack on Marines at the Beirut Airport; the slaughter of innocents on planes, ships, or in cabarets; or the intimidation of diplomats exercising non-violent means of reconciling differences have become standard practice for the enemies of the Western democracies.



Years of stability and prosperity in this country, Europe, and Japan led to an atmosphere of complacency, and a growing unwillingness to accept risk in the name of responsibility, or to defend interests with force if called upon. Ironically, this sentiment emerged from the years of peace our strong defense has made possible. It now appears, however, as if that very strength and the security it has afforded us have led many to assume that peace and security are matters of fact, and not the result of our strenuous efforts and enduring vigilance. This complacency threatens to turn our strength into a weakness, one our enemies are now exploiting.

LIC uses the instruments of peace, the pretense of accommodation, our commitment to moral principle, and the very language of freedom and democracy as weapons to undermine our resolve. In this struggle, the war of words and ideas has become every bit as important as the force of arms.

The challenge of LIC, then, is a formidable one. In meeting it, we must address not only the problems posed by our enemies but also the many problems plaguing the developing world. The United States must work with others to alleviate the social, political, and economic conditions that deprive so many of the world's peoples of basic rights or the means of living. Obviously, we are called upon to do this as Americans, and as human beings, but we also are summoned to this task because the Soviets and their proxies have proven so adept at exploiting instability for their aggressive purposes. The communists and others seek to exploit poverty and injustice by imposing a system of government whose cruelty is documented by history. We must take measures to protect our friends and allies, and work to free those who have lost their liberty and dignity under totalitarian systems.

This is not an enterprise, however, that promises instant success, nor is it a burden we can bear alone. We must work with others to achieve a common aim. The essence of our policy of assisting those who share our ideals must be one of patience and of helping others help themselves. For these reasons we have placed great emphasis on long-term economic and political development. This philosophy also underlies our security assistance effort and our humanitarian and civic assistance projects.

Since the advent of this Administration, we have seen the spread of democratic principles and the growth of freer, more open societies. Just eight years ago, for example, only two democratic governments -- Venezuela and Columbia -- existed in South America. Today, only two military regimes -- Chile and Paraguay -- survive among this continent's 11 republics. The face of the map in Central America now includes the democracies of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, as well as Costa Rica.

In the Philippines, Mrs. Aquino leads the democratic reinvigoration of one of our staunchest allies. We know, however, that democratic societies are, in their early stages of development, more vulnerable to subversion or overthrow. Emerging democratic governments must be provided with more than moral encouragement; they must receive the material support designed to promote and protect their development. Nor can we afford to cease working with others whose more authoritarian forms of government are offensive to our principles in the belief that our neglect will improve their future. The defense of our ideals and interests demands our involvement to counter the ambiguous aggression of our adversaries.

Our range of activities at the lower end of the conflict spectrum includes support to nations facing insurgent threats and to groups resisting communist aggression; peacekeeping operations (such as in the Sinai); peacetime contingency operations (such as against Libya or the current operations in the Persian Gulf); and counterterrorism efforts.

#### a. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

The period following World War II was a time of rapid change involving the collapse of European overseas empires, the liberation of countless peoples from colonial rule, and the emergence of many new states. In many cases the experience of independence and self-government did not produce a stable political order. Economic and social problems further complicated the difficult task of nation-building. If these problems were not enough, a number of groups, many inspired by communist doctrine, sought to exploit these problems to seize power through insurgency warfare, which combines Leninist subversive political organization techniques with guerrilla tactics.

The insurgent's goal is the development of a long-term political-military program, using protracted warfare to subvert and overpower governments in order to establish a totalitarian dictatorship. Cambodia, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Vietnam clearly illustrate the fate of societies that succumb to communist insurgents. Now El Salvador and the Philippines face similar threats.

It also has become clear that the Soviets, the Cubans, and others are only too willing to assist communist insurgents, and are investing considerable resources to promote and sustain them. There are training centers and field advisers to assist in developing clandestine organizations and guerrilla units, subversive groups, and terrorist organizations. There is a sophisticated international propaganda program to legitimize these movements and, as in the case of El Salvador, political pressure that is brought to bear on disparate insurgent groups to

unify their efforts. Once the insurgents are in power, however, the Soviets and their clients step in to consolidate control. In Nicaragua, for example, the Soviets supply major equipment; the Cubans provide security advisors, teachers, and doctors; the East Germans render advice on internal security forces; and so on. The pattern, revealed by the Grenada documents, can be discerned in South Yemen and Afghanistan as well as in Nicaragua.

In responding to these threats, our role is not to shoulder the burden ourselves, but to assist others in defending themselves. To accomplish this, we must train host nation forces in the technical skills needed to accomplish their mission, and we must work with the leadership of these countries to help them along the road to competent, just civilian government. Furthermore, we must not forget the importance of security. We must be prepared to provide the training, advice, technical support, intelligence, and other assistance necessary to ensure that host nations' military forces are well-trained, professional, and able to support the broad political-military programs essential to defeating insurgent movements. These local security forces will provide the shield behind which educators, doctors, and civil servants can carry out essential reforms. We must also recognize that security assistance is our most potent instrument. Security assistance is not to be viewed as the indiscriminate sale and transfer of arms to others but, rather, as assisting our friends or allies in providing the internal security essential to the growth of democratic institutions.

Our support is not only valuable to those nations that we believe are essential to preserving the common defense, but it also applies to various groups struggling against communist domination. Our support in the struggle for freedom and the safeguarding of democracy must also extend to those, such as the Nicaraguan resistance and the Afghan Mujahideen, who have seen their countries subverted or conquered by totalitarianism.

#### b. Peacetime Contingency Operations

As Grenada clearly demonstrated, the Soviets and their clients are willing to use subversion to expand their influence. Other states, Iran and Libya for example, also employ indirect or direct aggression and sponsor terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens to gain their ends. We must be able to counter such threats when they arise and deter ambiguous aggression in the future. This requires a range of capabilities, from special operations to general purpose forces, equipped and trained to respond immediately and decisively when called upon.

Our response to Libyan terrorism underscores our willingness to respond with force when reason failed. The decline of Qaddafi's overt use of terrorism is testimony to what effective action taken in a timely way can achieve. Our current efforts in

the Persian Gulf demonstrate further our resolve to defend our interests and to provide support to our friends and allies. We, along with our allies and friends, are determined to protect our interests and the rights of Freedom of Navigation in this critical region.

#### c. Peacekeeping Operations

Our military strength and our policy of deterrence have helped to prevent a major international war. Yet many areas of the world remain torn by unresolved tensions that can lead to the disruption of peace and the onset of conflict. As part of our commitment to international peace, the United States has employed its forces in peacekeeping efforts designed to separate belligerents and give them the time and the opportunity they need to resolve their differences amicably. Today, for example, U.S. forces are deployed in the Sinai as visible symbols of our effort to promote peace in the Middle East.

#### d. Counterterrorism

The growth of international terrorist organizations and the use of terrorism by a number of states as part of their foreign policy has changed the complexion of international relations. In countering terrorism, we must: develop and sustain our intelligence capabilities to penetrate and expose terrorist plots; work to bring terrorists to justice and to persuade their supporters to cease their support; preempt their attacks; and maintain the ability to defend successfully against those terrorist attacks that do occur. We already have undertaken significant steps to achieve these goals by developing special operations forces to respond to specific situations, and by enhancing the training and capabilities of our general purpose forces to counter the terrorist threat.

Significant progress has also been made in securing the cooperation of friendly nations, where the timely exchange of information has made possible the pre-emption of some terrorist attacks and the apprehension of several key terrorist figures. While we may never eliminate terrorism entirely, we are working to create an environment that makes it far more difficult for terrorists to achieve success.

#### e. Conclusion

The threat from low-intensity conflict lies in its insidious nature, and in its ability to misdirect attention from its ultimate consequences. We must remember that our enemies' purpose is to pursue ambiguous aggression to disarm our resolve and undermine our sense of purpose. LIC is one of the most serious challenges to our security that we face today, and our survival and well-being could depend on how we comprehend the threat and respond to it.